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REVIEWS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FOR POPULAR
CONSUMPTION*
The most enthusiastic supporter of the 18th Amendment must
admit that it has had at least one very unfortunate result; it
has induced many persons who think they know something about
constitutional law to write at least an article and perhaps a
book with the purpose of explaining the constitutional princi-
ple quite erroneously supposed to be involved, but usually only
with the effect of demonstrating how little the author knows
about constitutional law. Many lawyers (this malady is not
confined to lawyers but is especially virulent in our profession)
would probably have continued to enjoy high reputations as
authorities in constitutional law had they not, impelled by per-
sonal dislike of prohibition, clearly demonstrated the contrary
by displaying their ignorance in print.
The first is that the meaning of Liberty of the Man (the
of pseudo-constitutional law. It is rather more logically rea-
soned than many of its class, but the fact remains that it is sub-
stantially without value because based upon prejudice and fun-
damentally unsound assumptions, which may perhaps be sum-
marized as follows:
The first is that the meaning of Liberty of the Man (the
capitals are quoted from the book) is inherent and clearly de-
fined. Such an assumption is, of course, too ludicrous to be
worthy of serious consideration. Indeed, Jefferson himself later
gave up his concept of natural rights which he had embodied in
the Declaration of Independence., The author not merely cites
this discarded theory of the Declaration of Independence but
also such ancient authors as Blackstone for their concept of the
natural rights of man. Perhaps he would also cite Blackstone
and his contemporaries in connection with the natural rights of
married women! But after all these obsolete authorities are
quoted and enlarged upon, the author is still compelled to admit
that natural rights, whatever they are, may be restrained in the
interest of public safety. Of course, this gives away his entire
case, since the question of what public safety requires must be
left largely to the legislative bodies.
The next assumption, upon which the argument of the book
is based, is that the ideas of the fathers of our country-more
specifically the members of the Constitutional Convention-are
binding upon posterity forever. Why this should be we are not
*Losing Liberty Judicially, by Thomas James Norton, New York: The
MacMillan Company. 1928. pp. xi, 252. Price $2.50.
1 See Address by Hon. W. G. McAdoo before the Institute of Public
Affairs at the University of Virginia, 1927, at p. 103 of the Proceedings,
as published by the University.
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very definitely informed. The author cites some cases where he
thinks railroads have been rather harshly treated, but if we
should adhere to the ideas of the fathers of our country, rail-
roads would be abolished, as they knew nothing of such con-
trivances. The reviewer yields to no one in admiration for the
wisdom and practical sense of the persons who framed our Con-
stitution, but to assume that they could foresee all of the actual
changes of conditions and make the necessary legal adjust-
ments for such conditions, is to assume that they were each of
them infinitely wiser than any other man who has ever lived on
this earth. They did not claim such omniscience themselves, or
they would not have provided for amending the Constitution.
The author further lays down as a settled principle, that in
case of doubt the courts should decide in favor of vested inter-
ests, that is to say, that property should be preferred over per-
sonal rights. Of course, this is purely a matter of opinion,
and all that the reviewer can say is that he disagrees. He is
comforted with the reflection, however, that the great majority
of the people of this country would not accept this view of the
author and even the courts would not dare to avow an accept-
ance of such a position, although it seems that at times they
may actually adopt it.
But all of these assumptions-are really only applications of
the fundamental fallacy which runs through the entire book,
and which is almost invariably met with in this class of writing.
The author thinks that whatever he does not like is unconsti-
tutional. This is no doubt a simple solution of constitutional
difficulties, at least for the one making it, but it is entirely evi-
dent that if it is to be adopted, not merely will majority govern-
ment cease but any government at all will end for there will cer-
tainly be someone who will not like any particular government
activity, and to whom therefore, it will be unconstitutional. Mr.
Norton does not like prohibition, which, of course, is his privi-
lege. But his argument from such dislike to a theory that it is
contrary to "constitutional principles" is not merely a demon-
stration that he is unfit to write upon constitutional problems
but that he is absolutely ignorant of the most elementary of
these principles.
The specific applications need little further consideration. The
prohibition situation is the one discussed at the greatest length
but the author makes other verbal assaults upon some other
activities of the Federal and State governments, of which he
disapproves. In some of these cases he may be right, but for
the reason already suggested, that he proceeds upon funda-
mentally unsound bases, he is never convincing. Perhaps it may
be worth while to -mention one or two other rather elementary
matters where the author displays his own "constitutional illit-
eracy," a quality which he is purporting to remedy. He sug-
gests that the Federal Courts are constitutional courts and can-
not be interfered with by Congress. -Thus he is apparently ig-
norant of the fact that all of the courts except the Supreme
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Court could be abolished by Congress and that, therefore, what-
ever interference Congress may make in their functions cannot
be attacked upon constitutional grounds. Furthermore, the
author informs us2 that it should be held that the Senate is
without power to obtain information with respect to legislation
because it is not the sole legislative body, the House and the
President sharing the legislative function. If this conclusion
is correct it follows that, since no body or official has sole legis-
lative functions, no information which respect to legislative
questions can be obtained from anyone at all. The output of
Federal Legislation is not always of such striking excellence
with all sources of information open to the legislative bodies
that one can comfortably contemplate what would happen if
they were denied any information whatever, as our author seems
to think desirable.
It may seem that undue space has been used in reviewing such
a worthless type of book. This is undoubtedly true; but this
book and other of its kind constitute a very real menace to our
American institutions. The author is much excited over the
constitutional illiteracy of other people, but his book cannot
remedy the situation. Worse still it may transform a reader
who knows himself to be a constitutional illiterate (and who is,
therefore, not very dangerous) to the more dangerous illiterate
who thinks that he does know something about it.
Furthermore, the book, if it has any practical effect at all,
will lead to a further breaking down of public confidence in
the courts. The author attacks agitation for the recall of judges,
although curiously enough, this is in a paragraph just after the
one in which he asserts the doctrine that if the courts do not
uphold the constitutional rights of the individual the people are
entitled to take such matters in their own hands. The mere
recall of judges would seem to be a very mild method of effect-
ing this sort of revolution. But the book not merely attacks
liberal decisions of the Supreme Court but cites with approval
such reactionary cases as Pierce v. Society of Sisters,3 Adkins v.
Children's Hospital4 and Evans v. Gore.5 It is decisions like
these and like Lochner v. New York6 which it must be admitted
the author does have the grace not to commend, that will lead,
if anything does, to the recall of judges and to other similar
unfortunate measures. In the last analysis the stability of the
courts is dependent upon popular approval, and every decision
which is regarded by the public generally as an indication of
undue favoring of vested interests as against the interests of
the public as a whole, will tend just that much to break down
the popular confidence in the courts which is the foundation
upon which they actually rest.
2 In connection with his discussion of McGrain v. Daughterty, 273 U.
S. 135.
3 268 U. S. 510.
4261 U. S. 525.
5 253 U. S. 245.
6 198 U. S. 45.
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As for this book and others like it, it is only to be devoutly
hoped that we are about through with this flood of pseudo-
constitutional law. No doubt training in the Constitution is a
desirable thing, but the training should be conducted by persons
who have some real knowledge of American constitutional prin-
ciples; and this book, like most of its class, is a demonstration
only of its author's ignorance and prejudice.
ROBERT C. BROWN.
Indiana University School of Law.
STATE GOVERNMENT*
For a generation the members of the faculty of Indiana Uni-
versity in the field of Political Science and Government have
been known well and favorably by both students and teachers
of government throughout the college world. Professors Wood-
burn and Hershey have had no superiors and few peers in the
fields in which they have chosen to write. It is of great interest
and satisfaction to the old grads to find the younger men in the
department maintaining the high standards set by their senior
colleagues.
Professors Bates and Field have written a textbook on state
government which maintains the high standard of excellence
which we have learned to expect from the faculty, of our Alma
Mater.
The selection and arrangement of material is based upon the
practical class room experience of the authors. They have made
no "radical departures from the traditional methods of pre-
sentation."
They have not stressed political theory, although they have
included it, nor have they stressed the "problems" of state gov-
ernment, although they have recognized that problems exist.
The need of reform at times is recognized, but the authors never
assume the role of reformers. They claim in the preface that
"stress has been laid upon functions and services rather than
upon powers and prohibitions." In other words the actual work-
ing of state government is depicted rather than the more tech-
nical, legal side. It is the impression of the reviewer, however,
that the major portion of the text is devoted to the description,
somewhat detailed and carefully exact, of the "structure and
operation of the actual machinery of state government." It is
more completely a descriptive "handbook" of the organization
and machinery of state government than is any other text on
state government. It resembles J. J. Clarke's The Local Govern-
ment of the United Kingdom, rather than A. N. Holcombe's
State Government in the United States.
The above characterization of the book, however, does not
apply to the first five chapters which are more general and
philosophical in their nature. The first chapter deals with the
fundamental concept of political science, such as the purpose and
* By Frank G. Bates and Oliver P. Field. New York: Harper and
Brothers, 1928. PP. XI, 584.
